|
|
| Portal |
Operational mobility, beginning as a military theory concept during the period of mechanisation of armed forces, became a method of managing movement of forces by strategic commanders from the staging area to their Tactical Area of Responsibility.[1]
Within a strategic offensive or a strategic defence, it represents the level of command which coordinates the minute details of tactics with the overarching goals of strategy.[2]
Common synonyms for Operational mobility are the operational art derived from Russian: оперативное искусство, operational warfare, and operational level of war. During the 18th and early 19th centuries, the term grand tactics was often applied to describe manoeuvring of troops not tactically engaged, while in the late 19th century and beyond the First World War a term minor strategy was also in use,[3] in fact into the Second World War by some military commentators.[4]
The confusion over terminology was brought up in professional military publications such as the US Army's Infantry Journal that sought to identify "...slightly different shades of meaning, such as minor tactics, tactics, major tactics, minor strategy, major strategy, and grand strategy."[5]
Contents |
The term was not widely used in the West before the 1980s, where it was viewed as analogous to the expression "medium term" rather than short or long term when considered from the perspective of commander's decision-making about the timing of the movement. Western military thinkers, particularly those in the British Army, began to consider the concept during the 1980s and it slowly made its way into Western military terminology and officer combat training courses.[6] In part, it was popularised by its use in computer games, such as The Operational Art of War (Norm Koger).
Above all, the term as conceived by 20th century military theorists signifies the offensive, and therefore mobility at the level is at a scale bigger than one where line-of-sight and the time of day are important, and smaller than the strategic level, where production and diplomacy are considerations, termed operational battle.
Formations are of the operational level if they are able to conduct operational movement on their own, that is operating independently, and are of sufficient size to be directly handled or have a significant impact on the enemy's decision-making at the strategic level of military campaign or even the war. These methods of conducting operational mobility were pioneered by the German Army during the First World War and collaboratively developed with the Soviet Red Army in the late 1920s and 1930s by Mikhail Tukhachevsky who began to develop the concept between 1925 and 1929 as the basis of the Red Army's new field manual for the conduct of war. It was significantly tested and improved during the Second World War by Wehrmacht during initial phases of Operation Barbarossa, and by the Red Army for much of the rest of the war after Battle for Moscow offensive.
What constitutes the operational level has changed with the size and function of armies. During the Second World War, an operational-level formation was typically a corps or army.
With the increase in combat power of individual units during the Cold War era, this was accepted as a mechanised division, and in the post-Cold War, the combat power of relatively small formations is today as great as that wielded by larger formations in the past. A brigade of some 6,000 personnel has emerged among many militaries (notably the United States Army) as an operational-level formation, replacing the division.
Operational mobility functions to implement the overall strategy of an armed force by giving direction to tactical forces and providing them with the support needed to reach their tactical objectives. Operational formations contain sufficient assets to perform most or all military roles, and the Operational Manoeuvre Group of the Soviet Army besides elements of the Combat Arms included logistic, medical, and often supporting air assets such as armed helicopters from the overall military force, and hence are fully capable of independent operation.
The tactical forces of the lowest level of operational units perform actual engagement of the enemy and the commanders of these units are responsible for determining how best to perform this combat task. Tactical decisions such as where entrenchments will be placed on defense, and the formations that attacking units will move in are determined at this level.
The lowest operational units define the immediate objectives of these tactical units within their zones of command coordinating the offensive and defensive actions of the units as well as planning and applying supporting artillery fire as needed to accomplish those actions. Higher level operational units such as divisions and corps will support the lower level operational units with logistics and medical supplies, and have more extensive artillery and air support assets at their disposal.
These supporting fires are concentrated at the higher level in order that their striking power can be used where it is needed most. In addition, these forces may order lower level fire support to be applied at particularly important targets, through the technique known as Time on Target.
Toward the end of the Cold War, the United States Army developed the doctrine known as AirLand Battle which formalized U.S. operational doctrine around the concept of mobile warfare. This doctrine sought to create a coherent and integrated practice of all aspects of operational warfare from logistics to maneuver and the use of artillery and air support.